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CANADA’S FRESH WATER AND NAFTA:  
CLEARING THE MUDDIED WATERS
SCOTT GORDON† 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past half century Canada became a signatory to a number of 
complex and integrated international agreements. Canada’s obligations 
under   these  agreements   have  often  been   ill-­defined  and   vague.  This   is  
particularly   evident   in   regards   to  Canada’s   freshwater   resources.   This  
article will examine Canada’s international trade obligations, liabilities 
and   responsibilities   under   the   North  American   Free   Trade  Agreement  
(NAFTA). It will argue that Canada’s piecemeal approach to fresh water is 
insufficient  to  safeguard  its  sovereignty  over  this  indispensable  resource.  
The  article  begins  by  providing  a  comprehensive  and  global  perspective  
on trade in water by illustrating the prominent position that water is 
beginning to assume in the discourse of international relations. After 
situating the issue of trade in water in the global context, the North 
American  perspective  is  examined.  The  author  evaluates  the  applicable  
NAFTA   provisions,   corresponding   tribunal   case   law,   and   competing  
treaty interpretations that potentially threaten Canadian sovereignty 
over  its   fresh  water  resources.  The  author  then  outlines  and  critiques  
the actions and policies the Canadian Government has implemented to 
protect its domestic water supply. Finally, a number of policy options 
are presented that may help ensure Canada’s sovereignty over its fresh 
water resources. 
The  author’s  ultimate  conclusion   is   that  only   through  amendments   to  
NAFTA  can  Canada  once  again  become  author  of  its  own  future.
† Scott Gordon is a third year student at Dalhousie Law School. Upon graduation, he 
will  be  joining  the  Calgary  office  of  Macleod  Dixon.  An  earlier  version  of  this  article  
was awarded a Tory’s Writing Award and a North American Consortium on Legal 
Education (NACLE) Writing Award. The author would like to thank Katherine Reilly, 
Craig  Mack,  Alexander  Singh  and  Professor  Meinhard  Doelle  for  their  guidance,  ad-
vice  and  assistance.  The  author  would  like  to  note  that  any  remaining  shortcomings  of  
the article are his own. 
70 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
INTRODUCTION
In  an  interconnected  world  increasingly  governed  by  the  trinity  of  trade,  
commerce   and   corporations,   a   country’s   sovereignty   over   its   natural  
resources cannot be assumed. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the  case  of  Canada’s  fresh  water  resources.  Over  the  past  half  century  
Canada  became  a  signatory  to  a  number  of  complex  and  integrated  in-
ternational agreements. Canada’s obligations under these agreements 
have  often  been  ill-­defined  and  vague.  
This  article  will  examine  Canada’s  international  trade  obligations,  
liabilities and responsibilities under the North   American   Free   Trade  
Agreement (NAFTA).1 It will argue that Canada’s piecemeal approach 
to  fresh  water  is  insufficient  to  safeguard  its  sovereignty  over  this  indis-
pensable  resource.  This  article  is  in  four  parts.    Part  one  illustrates  the  
prominent position that water is beginning to assume in the discourse 
of  international  relations.  Part  two  outlines  the  applicable  NAFTA pro-
visions   that   threaten  Canada’s   sovereignty  over   its  water   supply.  Part  
three  offers  an  examination  and  critique  of  the  actions  and  policies  the  
Canadian  Government  has  implemented  to  protect  its  water.  Part  four  
proposes  a  number  of  policy  options  that  will  help  ensure  Canada’s  sov-
ereignty  over  its  fresh  water  resources.  
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF WATER
1. Supply and Distribution
Is  the  world’s  water  supply  capable  of  quenching  the  thirst  of  a  growing  
population,  reliant  on  a  readily  available  and  inexpensive  water  source?  
Although   less   than   five   percent   of   the  world’s  water   supply   is   clean  
and   fresh  enough   for  human  consumption,  experts   indicate   that   there  
is enough water in the world to meet the current and future needs of 
humankind.2  Geographic  abundance,  however,  does  not  translate  to  eq-
uitable  or  efficient  allocation  and  management.     Seven  percent  of   the  
1  17  December  1992,  32  I.L.M.  289  (entered  into  force  1  January  1994)  [NAFTA].
2  Jamie  W.  Boyd,  “Canada’s  Position  Regarding  an  Emerging  International  Fresh  
Water  Market  with  Respect  to  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement”  (1999)  5  
NAFTA  L.  &  Bus.  Rev.  Am.  325  at  326,  328  [Boyd].
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world’s   current   population   does   not   have   access   to   an   adequate   sup-
ply  of  water  to  ensure  survival.3 An  equally  appalling  statistic  puts  the  
number  of  annual  water-­related  deaths  at  between  two  and  five  million.  
Although when water is measured on an aggregate scale it cannot be 
said to be running out, water is certainly “running out in places where 
it’s  needed  most.”4
If present water use and distribution patterns continue, the world’s 
water  problems  will  compound  exponentially.  In  1997,  then  World  Bank  
Vice  President  Ismael  Serageldin  predicted  that,  “the  wars  of  the  next  
century  will  be  over  water.”5  By  2015,  the  U.S.  Government  estimates  
that more than 3 billion people will face water shortages for drinking 
and sanitation.6  Furthermore,  1.8  billion  people,   including  citizens  of  
geopolitical  hotspots  such  as  Pakistan,  South  Africa,  and  parts  of  China  
and  India,  will  suffer  from  “absolute  water  scarcity.”7 The problem of 
access to a safe and secure water supply is particularly problematic in 
the  water-­scarce  Middle  East.  Jordan  and  Israel  presently  rely  on  shared  
non-renewable water supplies to satisfy twenty percent of domestic de-
mand. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is rapidly depleting non-renewable sub-
terranean  aquifers  to  satisfy  much  of  its  water  needs.  This  brief  survey  
of global water distributions and shortages illustrates the point that wa-
ter is on the brink of becoming a major item in international political 
and economic affairs.
2. The Economics of Water
Basic  economic  theory  dictates  that  scarcity  and  value  are  interrelated  
concepts.  As  the  availability  of  a  good  decreases,  its  relative  value  in-
3  Christopher  S.  Maravilla,  “The  Canadian  Bulk  Water  Moratorium  and  Its  
Implications  for  NAFTA”  (2001)  10  Currents  29  at  29  [Maravilla].
4     Marq  de  Villiers,  “Three  Rivers”  in  Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  ed.,  
Whose  Water  is  It?  The  Unquenchable  Thirst  of  a  Water-­Hungry  World (Washington: 
National  Geographic  Society,  1999)  41  at  45  [Three  Rivers].
5    Cynthia Baumann, “Water Wars: Canada’s Upstream Battle to Ban Bulk Water 
Exports”  (2001)  10  Minn.  J.  Global  Trade  109  at  109  [Baumann].
6  Douglas  Jehl,  “Introduction”  in Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  supra note 
4,  ix  at  xiii  [Jehl].
7   Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 30.  
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creases. When underlying economic principles are applied to water, the 
calculus illustrates a disturbing trend. 
Corporate   interests  and  international  business  conglomerates  have  
already   seen   glimpses   of   the   profit   potential   of   trade   in   water.   The  
American   biotech   corporation   Monsanto   recently   declared   its   inten-
tions   to  enter   the   lucrative  business  of  water  supply   in  stating,  “there  
are markets in which there are predictable sustainability challenges and 
therefore  opportunities   to   create   business   value.”8  Ricardo  Petrella,   a  
trade analyst and water market watcher, has claimed that a “global high 
command”   for  water   has   been   building   for   the   last   decade.9   Perhaps  
most  illustrative  of  the  impending  big  business  interest  in  water  is  World  
Bank’s  definitive   statement:   “one  way  or  another,  water  will   soon  be  
moved  around  the  world  as  oil  is  now.”10
The  commodification  of  water  has  already  taken  hold.  Hong  Kong  
purchases water from its neighbouring territories. A host of Caribbean 
islands   import   fresh  water   to   quench   the   insatiable   thirst   of   growing  
tourist industries. South Africa compliments its domestic supply by im-
porting  from  the  water-­abundant  nation  of  Lesotho.  Malaysia  and  Sin-
gapore are signatories to a water contract, agreed to in 1961 and sched-
uled  to  conclude  in  2061,  where  Malaysia  supplies  its  smaller,  wealthier  
neighbour with untreated drinking water.11 In total, no less than thirty 
countries already import at least one third of their water resources.
In   addition   to   the   traditional   methods   of   water   commodification  
through  bottled  water  sales  and  diversion  projects,  companies  are  be-
ginning  to  investigate  more  innovative  means  of  trade.  Bulk  freshwater  
transfers  are  presently  slated  to  begin  through  the  vehicle  of  converted  
oil  tankers.  On  March  25,  2004,  Israel  and  Turkey  penned  a  twenty-­year  
contract  for  the  sale  of  50  million  cubic  meters  of  water  per  year.12 Under 
the  Agreement,  water  will  be  extracted  from  Turkey’s  Manavgat  River  
8    Maude  Barlow,  “The  World’s  Water:  A  Human  Right  or  Corporate  Good?”  in  
Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  supra  note  4,  25  at  29  [Barlow].  
9  Ibid.  at  38.
10  Ibid.  at  38.
11   Brian  Anderson,  “Selling  Great  Lakes  Water  to  a  Thirsty  World:  Legal,  Policy  &  
Trade  Considerations”  (1999)  Buff.  Envtl.  L.J.  215  at  242  [Anderson].
12  Dr.  Isabel  Al  Assar,  “Future  Trading  of  Water  as  a  Commodity”  (Paper  presented  
to  the  Third  International  Symposium,  University  of  Dundee,  June  14,  2000)  Paper  
updated  January  2005.    
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and  transported  via  converted  oil  tankers  to  Israel.  Jonathan  Peled,  an  
Israeli  Foreign  Ministry  spokesperson,  has  said,  “this  landmark  agree-
ment  transforms  water  into  an  internationally  accepted  ‘commodity.’”13 
This agreement between Turkey and Israel relocates the fresh water de-
bate from intellectual and academic realms into the real world of poli-
tics,  profit  and  economics.
3. Locating Canada’s Water Issue
In  the  North  American  context,  the  politics  of  water  operates  in  a  par-
ticularly   unique   and   challenging   context.  Water   experts   estimate   that  
Canada holds between nine and twenty percent of the global share of 
fresh water resources.14  The  exact  percentage  is  dependent  on  whether  
Canada’s inaccessible fresh water supplies – the water ‘locked away’ in 
glaciers  and  the  far  North  –  is  included  in  the  equation.  Even  if  the  more  
conservative  figure  of  nine  percent  is  adopted,  the  undeniable  conclu-
sion  is  that  Canada  enjoys  an  abundant  supply  of  this  increasingly  valu-
able  resource.  The  value  of  Canada’s  fresh  water  supply  becomes  even  
more astounding when computed on a per capita basis. The combination 
of low population density and staggering supply places Canada in the 
position as a gatekeeper of the world’s water supply.
The United States, in contrast, has only one tenth of Canada’s water 
and nearly ten times its population.15 Furthermore, America has become 
reliant on unsustainable means to meet its current water demands – a 
trend witnessed throughout the western world. Water is currently being 
pumped  from  subterranean  aquifers  at  alarming  rates.  The  Olgatha  un-
derground  aquifer,  which  covers  one  third  of  the  United  States,  “is  being  
depleted  at  a  rate  eight  times  faster  than  it  is  replenished.”16 The large-
scale  diversion  projects  and  the  irrigation  techniques  of  the  American  
Southwest  exemplify  the  U.S.’s  water  predicament.  Arizona,  once  a  dry  
and  barren  wasteland,  has  defied  environmental  constraints  by  irrigating  
5,000  square  kilometres  of  desert  for  crop  production.  The  Imperial  Ir-
rigation  District,  a  2,000  square  kilometre  strip  of  irrigated  farmland  in  
13  Ibid.
14    Baumann, supra  note  5  at  112;;  Boyd,  supra  note  2  at  328.
15    Anderson, supra  note  11  at  218.
16   Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 30.
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California,  has  similarly  relied  on  vast  diversion  projects  and  wholesale  
groundwater  extractions  to  create  favourable  farming  conditions.17 The 
American southwest has built its prosperity on the assumed constant of 
an  inexpensive  and  readily  available  source  of  water.  The  future  pros-
perity  and  growth  of  the  region  will  depend  on  the  continued  existence  
of a cheap water supply. As the twin factors of increased demand and 
decreased  supply  begin  to  take  hold,  the  United  States  will  inevitably  
look to its northern neighbour to help supplement its water supplies.
4. Normative Dynamics
Should the basic tenets of supply and demand dictate the allocation of 
the  world’s  water?  Professor  Joseph  Sax  argues  that  water  is  more  than  
just  a  common  natural  resource.    He  characterizes  water  as  a  “heritage  
resource”,  grouping  it  not  with  resources  such  as  oil,  gas  and  forestry,  
but rather bestowing water with its own special status.18  Professor  Sax  
notes  that  a  community’s  attachment  to  this  “unique  life-­  and  economy-­
sustaining”  resource  is  more  aligned  with  an  attachment  to  architecture,  
art or other cultural iconography than the other category of natural re-
sources.19
Most  Canadians  appear  to  subscribe  to  the  notion  that  the  true  value  
of  water  cannot  be  measured  in  simple  monetary  terms.  When  the  gov-
ernment  of  British  Columbia   crafted  plans   to   allow   for   the   export  of  
water  to  the  United  States  via  converted  tankers,  the  public  reacted  with  
visceral   distaste.20  The   proposed   exportation   and   commodification   of  
water  spurred  a  heated  and  contentious  debate  that  led  the  B.C.  govern-
ment  to  place  a  moratorium  on  fresh  water  exports.  When  the  water  de-
bate  reached  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Commons,  veteran  MP  Bill  Blaik-
ie  proclaimed,  “water  is  as  Canadian  as  hockey,  as  the  Mounties,  as  the  
beaver.”21  After  a  similar  venture  was  proposed  by  an  Ontario  company,  
17  Scott  Philip  Little,  “Canada’s  Capacity  to  Control  the  Flow:  Water  Export  and  the  
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement”  (1999)  8  Pace  Int’l  L.  Rev.  127  at  128,  129  
[Little].
18    Anderson, supra note 11 at 216.
19  Anderson, supra note 11 at 216. 
20  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 31.
21  Anderson, supra note 11 at 216.
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and  an  equally  harsh  public  reaction,  the  Canadian  government  imple-
mented a federal moratorium on bulk water transfers.22 In defending the 
moratorium,  then  Canadian  Foreign  Affairs  Minister  Lloyd  Axworthy  
bluntly  declared,  “[water]  is  not  just  a  commodity.”23
The  issue  of  water  export  is  thus  immersed  in  a  host  of  normative,  
ethical,  financial,  political  and  economic  claims.  Although  Canada  will  
eventually  have  to  face  these  claims,  a  threshold  question  must  first  be  
answered:  given  international  commitments,  is  Canada  restricted  in  how  
it  manages,  controls  and  distributes  its  water?  A  partial  answer  to  this  
quandary  lies  in  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement.
II. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
1. An Overview
NAFTA  creates  a  comprehensive  and  complex  trade  regime  that  binds  
the  Canadian  government  to  a  host  of  trilateral  obligations.  Trade  experts  
have  identified  Chapter  3  (Trade  in  Goods)  and  Chapter  11 (Investment)  
as   potentially   constraining  Canada’s   discretion   over   its  water   policy.  
Although some commentaries suggest that Chapter 12 (Cross Border 
Trade  in  Services)  may  also  potentially  hinder  Canada’s  ability  to  make  
policy,   the  majority  of  academic   literature  and  governmental  analysis  
on  the  subject  identifies  Chapters  3  and  11  as  the  chief  impediments  to  
Canada’s  ability  to  exert  sovereign  control  over  its  water  resources. The 
following analysis will therefore focus on Chapters 3 and 11.
2. Chapter 3: Trade in Goods
i. Article 300: Scope and Coverage
a. Threshold  Issue
The  threshold   issue   in   the  debate  over  fresh  water  exports   is  whether  
NAFTA applies to water. Article 300 states that Chapter 3 of NAFTA 
22  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 29.
23  Anderson, supra note 11 at 217.
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only  applies  to  “trade  in  goods  of  a  Party.”24  Therefore,  the  provisions  
in Chapter 3 of the NAFTA  only  apply  to  water  if  it  first  qualifies  as  a  
“good.”
Article 201 of NAFTA  defines  “goods  of  a  Party”  as  “domestic  prod-
ucts as these are understood in the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  
Trade  (GATT)  or  such  goods  as  the  Parties  may  agree,  and  includes  orig-
inating  goods  of  that  Party.”25 The GATT  defines  water,  by  reference  to  
the International  Convention  on  the  Harmonized  Commodity  Descrip-
tion and Coding System,  as  “including  natural  or  artificial  mineral  wa-
ter and aerated waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter  nor  flavoured;;  ice  and  snow.”26 An  explanatory  note  to  the  tariff  
schedule  further  provides  that  water  includes  “ordinary  natural  water  of  
all  kinds  (other  than  sea  water).”27
On its face, the GATT  tariff  schedule  appears  to  characterize  water  as  
a good and thus incorporates it into NAFTA by operation of Articles 201 
and  300.  The  Canadian  government  and  a  host  of  academic  commenta-
tors  have  challenged  this  interpretation.  The  assertion  that  water  is  not  a  
“good,”  and  therefore  not  applicable  to  NAFTA  obligations, is one of the 
government’s  chief  assumptions  underlying  its  water  policy.28
ii. Is Water a Good?
The  Canadian  government  and  other  subscribers  to  the  view  that  water  
is  not  a  “good”  enlist  the  following  arguments  in  support  of  their  posi-
tion.
First,  proponents  of  the  view  that  water  does  not  qualify  as  a  “good”  
focus  on   the  definition  of  “good”   in  NAFTA’s Chapter 2. Article 201 
defines   the   “goods   of   a   Party”   as   “domestic   products   as   […]   under-
stood under the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.”  The  argu-
ment  follows  that  for  an  item  to  be  a  “good”  under  NAFTA, it must be a 
24    NAFTA, supra note 1.
25     30  October  1947,  58  U.N.T.S.  187  (entered  into  force  1  January  1948)  [GATT  
1947].
26   June  14,  1983,  1503  U.N.T.S.  3,  4  (entered  into  force  1  January  1988).
27  Boyd, supra note  2  at  134.
28     Canada,  Department  of  Environment,  The  Management  of  Water:  Frequently  
Asked Questions,  Question  #  5,  online:  <  http://www.ec.gc.ca/water/en/manage/  
removal/e_FAQ.htm#5  >  [FAQ].
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“product”  under  the  GATT.  The  term  “product”  is  not  defined  under  the  
GATT,  however  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  defines  “product”  as  “a  
thing  produced.”29 An interpretation that emphasises the GATT “prod-
uct”  requirement  mandates  that  before  a  resource  qualifies  as  a  “good,”  
it  must  first  undergo  a  process   that  somehow  transforms   the   resource  
into an item of commerce.30 Proponents  of   this  view  assert   that   since  
water  in  its  natural  state  is  an  unexploited  resource,  like  oil  and  gas  in  
the  ground,  it  is  not  a  “product”  and  therefore  not  subject  to  the  provi-
sions of Chapter 3. The counter argument to this interpretation of Article 
201 is a simple reliance on the unambiguous wording of the GATT’s 
tariff schedule which states, “ordinary water of all kinds (other than sea 
water)”  qualifies  as  a  “good.”31
Second,  the  Canadian  government  insists  that  the  inclusion  of  water  
as a tariff heading under the GATT  is  not  determinative.  In  a  1999  policy  
paper released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade,  the  Canadian  government  argues  that  the  GATT tariff schedule 
“does  not  tell  us  if  and  when  water  is  a  good;;  it  only  tells  us  that  when  
water  is  classified  as  a  good,  it  falls  under  a  particular  tariff  heading.”32 
The  government  insists  that  to  imbue  the  schedule  with  substantive  in-
terpretive  content  is  to  adopt  a  “mistaken  view”  of  the  tariff  schedule.  
Furthermore,  the  government  explains  that  the  tariff  schedule  is  merely  
an  “organizational   structure”,  utilized   for   the  purposes  of  administra-
tive  classification  and  ease  of  reference  and  it  is  silent  on  the  issue  of  
whether  water  is  a  “good.”33
Third,  a  1993  Joint  Statement,  released  by  the  Canadian  government,  
is put forth as proof that water remains outside the rubric of Chapter 3:
The  governments  of  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  in  order  
to  correct   false   interpretations,  have  agreed   to   state   the   following  
jointly   and   publicly   as   Parties   to   the  North  American  Free  Trade  
Agreement (NAFTA):
29  2d ed, s.v.  “product”.
30   Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 33.
31  Boyd, supra  note  2  at  134.
32  Canada,  Public  Works  Canada,  Law  and  Government  Division,  Bulk Water 
Removals,  Water  Exports  and  the  NAFTA,  David  Johansen  (PRB  00-­41E),  20  
February  2001  (Updated  31  January  2002),  online:  <  http://dsp-­psd.pwgsc.gc.ca  
/Collection-­R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0041-­e.htm>  [Johansen].
33  Ibid.
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The NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of any 
Party  to  the  Agreement.
Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become 
a  good  or  product,  it  is  not  covered  by  the  provisions  of  any  trade  
agreement,  including  the  NAFTA  […].  Water  in  its  natural  state  in  
lakes,  rivers,  reservoirs,  aquifers,  water  basins  and  the  like  is  not  a  
good  or  product,   is  not   traded,  and   therefore   is  not  and  has  never  
been subject to the terms of any trade agreement.34
The   blunt   wording   and   authoritative   tone   of   the   Joint   Statement  
lends  credibility   to   the  Canadian  government’s  position.  A  number  of  
political  and  legal  realities,  however,  detract  from  this  stance.  A  com-
mon  critique  of  the  government’s  reliance  on  the  Joint  Statement  is  that  
it is not legally binding upon the NAFTA parties.35 At best, the Joint 
Statement  can  be  characterized  as  “soft  law”  and  utilized  only  as  a  tool  
of treaty interpretation.36  Furthermore,  even  reliance  on  the  Joint  State-
ment  for  the  purposes  of  treaty  interpretation  may  be  problematic  given  
subsequent  U.S.  declarations.  A  United  States  announcement  released  
the  same  day  as  the  above  Joint  Statement,  lacks  the  definitive  wording  
and  unwavering  tone  of  the  Canadian  release:
[T]he  Governments  of  the  United  States,  Canada,  and  Mexico  are  
today releasing a joint statement of future work on dumping and 
antidumping  duties  and  subsidies  and  countervailing  duties,  and  a  
joint statement on natural water resources and the NAFTA. None of 
these  statements  change  the  NAFTA  in  any  way.37
This less than compelling American release coupled with the fact 
that  “it  has  long  been  recognized  in  international  practice  that  govern-
ments may agree on joint statements of policy or intention that do not 
establish  legal  obligations,”  severely  curtails  the  Canadian  position  that  
34    Governments  of  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  Joint  Statement  (1  
December 1993) cited to: Johansen, supra note 33. 
35    West  Coast  Environmental  Law,  Legal  Opinion  commissioned  by  the  Council  
of  Canadians  re:    Water  Export  Controls  and  Canadian  Environmental  Trade  
Obligations,  17  August  1999  [WCEL].
36   Little, supra  note  17  at  140.
37  WCEL, supra  note  35.[emphasis  added].
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its  unilaterally  released  and  unsigned  1993  joint  statement  disqualifies  
water from Chapter 3.38
Fourth, proponents rely on Canadian domestic legislation to but-
tress their claim that water is not a NAFTA  “good.”  Section  7(2)  of  the  
North  American  Free  Trade  Implementation  Act  states that only water 
“packaged  as  a  beverage  or  in  tanks,  but  not  natural,  surface  and  ground  
water”  falls  within  the  scope  of  NAFTA.39  The  flaws  in  this  argument  are  
twofold.  First,  there  is  no  analogous  caveat  to  the  definition  of  “good”  
in   the   actual   text   of  NAFTA.   Since   inherent   authority   to  override   the  
provisions  of  an  international  agreement  is  not  embedded  in  domestic  
legislation, s. 7(2) is not binding on the NAFTA parties. Second, and 
perhaps  more  significant,  is  the  fact  that  the  Canadian  government  felt  
the  need  to  include  a  restrictive  definition  of  water  in  domestic  legisla-
tion  yet  failed  to  effect  parallel  safeguards  in   the  actual  provisions  of  
NAFTA.  Given  the  close  temporal  proximity  between  the  drafting  of  the  
implementation legislation and the actual drafting of NAFTA, the logical 
inference is that the Canadian negotiating delegation made a conscious 
decision,  or  simply  lacked  sufficient  leverage,  to  expressly  exclude  wa-
ter from NAFTA.  
The  arguments  that  water  is  excluded  from  the  ambit  of  Chapter  3  
are,  on  the  whole,  unconvincing.  Reliance  on  a  highly  sophistic  treaty  
interpretation of the GATT tariff schedule, a legally unenforceable joint 
statement  and  domestic  legislation  are  an  insufficient  basis  to  conclude  
that  water  is  not  a  “good.”  
In  addition  to  the  countervailing  arguments  cited  above,  American  
jurisprudence and international case law adopt the position that water 
is  a  “good.”  In  Sporhase v Nebraska, the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States held that water is an article of commerce under U.S. law.40 
The case concerned a Nebraska law limiting the rights of neighbouring 
states to apply for water use permits. Nebraska argued that state owner-
ship  of  a  resource  entitled  it  to  discriminate  against  out-­of-­state  inves-
tors  and,  alternatively,  given  that  water  is  essential  for  human  survival  
it  deserves  special  status  apart  from  other  natural  resources.41 The Court 
38     Jerome  Hinkle,  “Troubled  Waters:  Policy  and  Action  in  the  Great  Lakes”  (2003)  20 
T.M.  Cooley  L.  Review  281  at  302  [Hinkle].
39   S.C.  1993,  c.  44.
40     458  U.S.  941  (1982).
41     Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 33.
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struck down the law as unconstitutional and concluded that water was 
an article of commerce, largely because of the nature of, and trade in, 
commodities almost wholly comprised of water.
International  law  also  holds  that  water  is  a  “good.”  In  Commission 
v. Italy,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  held  that  the  term  “good”  encom-
passes  anything  capable  of  monetary  evaluation   that   is  placed  within  
the  flow  of  commerce.42 Similarly, in Dunbalk  Water  Supply, the Court 
gave  an  equally  wide  interpretation  of  “goods.”43  It held that the term 
not only includes materials produced, but also materials supplied in, the 
provision  of   services.44  The  wide   latitude  given   to   the  definition  of   a  
“good”  at  international  law  appears  elastic  enough  to  include  Canada’s  
fresh water supplies.
ii.  Article  301:  National  Treatment
a. Scope of Article 301
Article 301 of NAFTA  states  that  each  Party  must  “accord  national  treat-
ment  to  the  goods  of  another  party.”  The  national  treatment  provisions  
of NAFTA  mandate   that  Canada  must  not  extend  to   the  United  States  
and  Mexico  treatment  “less  favourable”  than  the  “most  favourable  treat-
ment”  extended  to  similar  domestic  goods  and  services.  
The scope and reach of Article 301 is somewhat ambiguous. Trade 
experts  and  NAFTA  commentators  have  argued  the  national   treatment  
provisions  do  not  apply  to  exports.45 If this reading were correct, foreign 
producers  and  consumers  would  be  precluded  from  claiming  an  equal  
right to, or stake in, Canadian water resources. The argument that Arti-
cle  301  is  limited  to  imports  is  grounded  in  the  wording  of  the  provision  
which  states,  “each  Party  shall  accord  national  treatment  to the goods of 
another party.”  The  limiting  phrase  “goods  of  another  party”  suggests  
that  the  provision  only  applies  to  imports.    
However,  Annex   301.3   seemingly   reincorporates   exports   into   the  
framework  of  Article  301.  Annex  301.3,   an  attachment   to  Chapter  3,  
specifically  exempts  export  control  measures  on  logs  and  unprocessed  
42     Case  7/68,  [1968]  E.C.R.  42  (European  Court  of  Justice).
43     Case  45/87,  [1988]  E.C.R.  4929  (European  Court  of  Justice).
44    WCEL, supra  note  35.  
45    Little, supra  note  17  at  135.
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fish  from  the  provisions  of  Article  301.  To  read  Article  301  as  excluding  
exports  would  render  Annex  301.3  superfluous.46  Although  this  endeav-
our is essentially one of statutory interpretation, assuming a coherency 
in   drafting,   it   appears   that  Article   301,   by   reference   to  Annex  301.3,  
includes  exports.
b. Substantive Obligations of Article 301
Article 301 mandates that once Canada allows domestic producers to 
engage   in  economic  activity   relating   to  water,   at  minimum,   the   same  
rights  must  extend  to  foreign  business  interests.  It  is  important  to  note  
that  Article  301  does  not  dictate  any  substantive  obligations  in  the  ab-
sence  of  commercial  activity.  Therefore,  Canada  retains  sovereign  con-
trol  over  its  water  resources  until  the  moment  it  allows  water  to  enter  
the  cycle  of  commerce.  However,  if  Canada  allows  water  to  be  removed  
from   its  natural   source,   in   furtherance  of  economic  or  financial  ends,  
it  will  be  obligated  to  extend  to  foreign  interests  the  same  commercial  
privileges  and  rights  of  access  as  it  would  to  Canadian  companies.  The  
Council  for  Canadians  summarizes  this  reasoning  by  stating  that  once  
water enters the cycle of commerce, “trading water cannot be limited to 
Canadian  companies.”47
iii. Article 309: Import and Export Restrictions
The  import  and  export  restriction  provisions  of  NAFTA are the teeth of 
Chapter 3. Article 309 states:
no  Party  may   adopt   or  maintain   any   prohibition   or   restriction   on  
the  importation  of  any  good  of  another  Party  or  on  the  exportation  
or  sale  for  export  of  any  good  destined  for  the  territory  of  another  
Party,  except  in  accordance  with  Article  XI  of  GATT.48 
Article  309  prohibits  the  “restriction”  of  exports  or  imports  unless  such  
measures  are  permissible  under  Article  XI  of  the  GATT.49 That article 
46    WCEL, supra  note  35.
47    Johansen, supra note 32.
48    NAFTA, supra note 1.
49     Note:  Article  XI  also  includes  a  minor  exception  to  allow  for  trade  restrictions  
in  instances  of  “domestic  shortages  of  essential  products.”  Academics  generally  
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can be distinguished from Article 309 by the fact it allows signatories 
to  maintain  export  “duties,  taxes  or  other  charge.”  Read  in  isolation,  Ar-
ticle 309, by operation of GATT  Article  XI,  seems  to  allow  for  a  coun-
try  to  place  a  “duty,  tax  or  other  charge”  on  exports.  On  this  reading,  
Canada  need  only  enlist  such  sufficiently  high  tariffs  to  stem  the  flow  of  
water  exports.50
However,  Article  314  of  NAFTA  specifically  prohibits  such  meas-
ures.  Article  314  expands  the  ambit  of  Article  309  by  mandating  that  “no  
Party  may  adopt  or  maintain  any  duty,  tax  or  other  charge  on  the  export  
of  any  good”  unless the same restriction is placed on products “destined 
for   domestic   consumption.”  When  Article   309   is   read   in   conjunction  
with  Article  314,  it  dictates  that  before  Canada  can  restrict  water  exports  
to  the  United  States  through  the  implementation  of  a  sufficiently  high  
“duty,   tax   or   other   charge”,   it  must   impose   similar  measures   on  wa-
ter destined for domestic consumption. In addition to breaching Article 
314,  a  proposed  “duty,  tax  or  other  charge”  would  most  likely  breach  
Canada’s  overarching  NAFTA commitment, outlined in Article 302, to 
reduce  and  eliminate  tariffs.  A  political  incentive  and  potential  trade  war  
also  renders  the  duty  approach  a  non-­possibility.  Article  XI  of  the  GATT 
offers  little  relief  from  Article  309  and  provides  negligible  policy  space  
for  government  to  restrict  water  exports.
iv.  Article  315:  Other  Export  Measures
Article  315   tempers   the  harshness  of  Article  309  by  permitting   trade  
restrictions,  provided   they  are   implemented  “in   relation   to”  a  conser-
vation  measure.  Article  315  accomplishes  this  by  incorporating  GATT 
conservation  provisions  Article  XI:  2(a)  and  Article  XX  (g),  (i)  or  (j).  
These  conservation  exemptions,  however,  are  not  absolute.  Attached  to  
Article  315  is  a  “proportionality”  caveat  which  states  that  parties  may  
only  adopt  conservation  based  trade  restrictions  if:
the restriction does not reduce the proportion   of   the   total   export  
shipments  of   the   specific  good  made  available   to   that  other  Party  
accept  that  the  “domestic  shortages”  saving  provision  of  Article  XI  provides  little  
manoeuvrability  for  restrictive  trade  measures.  To  rely  on  Article  XI,  Canada  would  
have  to  experience  a  “critical  shortage”  before  implementing  a  restriction  on  water  
exports.
50     WCEL,  supra  note  35.
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relative to   the   total   supply   of   that   good   of   the   Party  maintaining  
the  restriction  as  compared  to  the  proportion  prevailing  in  the  most  
recent   36-­month   period   for   which   data   are   available   prior   to   the  
imposition  of  the  measure,  or  in  such  other  representative  period  on  
which  the  Parties  may  agree.51
Before  examining  Article  315  further,  it  is  pertinent  to  briefly  examine  
the language and judicial interpretations of the GATT  conservation  pro-
visions.
v.  GATT  Conservation  Provisions
Article  XX  (g)  is  the  most  utilized  of  the  GATT  conservation  measures.  
Article  XX  (g)  allows  a  signatory  country  to  implement  an  export  restric-
tion,  provided  it  is  “primarily  aimed  at”  the  conservation  of  an  exhaust-
ible  natural  resource.  The  language  of  Article  XX  (g)  appears  to  allow  
Canada  to  restrict  water  exports  by  drafting  sufficiently  sensitive,  con-
servation  focused  legislation.    Judicial  interpretation  of  Article  XX  (g),  
however,   has  been   less   than  deferential   toward  government  mandated  
‘conservation’  measures.  WTO  Appellate  Body  jurisprudence  has  liber-
ally  interpreted  the  substantive  provision  of  Article  XX  (g),  and  critiqued  
conservation   measures   under   the   provision’s   introductory   clause   (the  
chapeau).  The  chapeau  demands  that  all  conservation  based  trade  restric-
tions must be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of ar-
bitrary  or  unjustifiable  discrimination  between  countries  where  the  same  
conditions   prevail,   or   a   disguised   restriction   on   international   trade.”52 
The WTO case of the Shrimp Turtle I illustrates this trend.53
In the Shrimp  Turtle  I, a U.S. law imposed to protect sea turtles was 
deemed  a  valid  measure  under  XX  (g)  but  was  held  to  violate  the  cha-
peau  of  the  Article.  The  law  met  the  substantive  “relating  to”  test  of  XX  
(g),  in  that  it  was  “narrowly  focused”  on  the  objective  of  protecting  sea  
turtles  and  did  not  cast  a  “disproportionately  wide”  net  in  accomplishing  
the  desired  policy  objective.54 The  application  of  the  law,  however,  vio-
51    NAFTA, supra  note  1  [emphasis  added].
52    GATT  1947,  supra  note  25.
53    (1998)  WTO  Doc.  WT/DS58/AB/R  (Appellate  Body  Report).
54     Robert  J.  Girouird,  “Water  Export  Restrictions:  A  Case  Study  of  WTO  Dispute  
Settlement  Strategies  and  Outcomes”  (2003)  15  Geo.Int’l  Envtl.  L.  Rev  247  at  266  
[Girouird].
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lated the chapeau  in  that  it  mandated  environmental  compliance  identi-
cal to U.S. practices, applied restrictions inconsistently and did not en-
gage  in  “concerted  and  cooperative  efforts”  to  address  protection.55
This brief case summary of the  Shrimp  Turtle  is  not  intended  to  ex-
haustively  survey  the  GATT  jurisprudence  on  Article  XX  (g),  rather  it  
is  included  to  illustrate  the  restrictive  nature  of  the  potentially  valuable  
conservation  exemptions  of   the  GATT.  Given   the   strict   judicial   inter-
pretation  of  the  conservation  measures  and  the  WTO  Appellate  Body’s  
apparent distaste for all measures limiting trade, it is unlikely that a 
Canadian  law  restricting  water  exports  would  qualify  as  a  genuine  con-
servation  measure.    
6.  Proportionality  under  Article  315
Even  if  a  Canadian  law  restricting  water  exports  could  qualify  under  the  
rubric  of  Article  XX  (g),  it  would  be  a  pyrrhic  victory  given  the  “pro-
portionality”   requirement   in  Article   315.  Article   315   states   that   once  
Canada  begins  to  export  water  it  cannot  restrict  exports  unless it initi-
ates  a  proportionate  domestic   restriction.  Critics  of  Article  315  decry  
that  if  Canada  begins  to  export  water,  NAFTA signatories are “entitled to 
a  proportionate  share  of  Canadian  water  resources  in  perpetuity.”56 The 
Council of Canadians argues that “proportionality means that as long as 
there  is  a  drop  of  water  left  we  can  never  end  water  exports  regardless  of  
the  environmental  effects  in  Canada  or  the  needs  of  Canadians”57 This 
statement, although perhaps hyperbolic, demonstrates the highly con-
tentious and emotionally charged nature of the water debate and cap-
tures  the  profound  implications  of  the  Article  315  restriction.  If  Canada  
begins  to  trade  in  water,  the  proportionality  requirement  of  Article  315  
will  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  turn  off  the  proverbial  tap.
55    Ibid at 267.
56    WCEL, supra  note  35.
57    Johansen, supra note 32.
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3. CHAPTER 11: INVESTOR RIGHTS
i. Overview 
Chapter  11  is  arguably  the  most  controversial  part  of  NAFTA.  The in-
vestor  rights  provisions  imbue  corporations  with  a  wide  range  of  rights  
including   national   treatment   (1102),   protection   from   expropriation  
(1110) and, perhaps most notably, the right to bring a claim against a 
sovereign  country  in  an  international  tribunal  (1116).  Some  critics  argue  
that  although  Article  1116’s  compulsory  “model  of  adjudication”  may  
be   desirable   in   a   strictly   commercial   context,   it   is   not   appropriate   in  
adjudicating broad public policy decisions.58 This  extraordinary  divest-
ment of power to corporations greatly complicates Canada’s ability to 
exercise  domestic  water  policy.
Before  delving  into  the  provisions  of  Chapter  11,  it  is  worth  high-
lighting   some   of   the   distinctive   characteristics   of   the   investor   rights  
section. First, unlike the NAFTA  provisions  governing  trade  in  goods,  
Chapter   11   applies   regardless   of  whether  water   is   characterized   as   a  
“good.”  Notwithstanding  vindication  of  the  Canadian  governments  po-
sition   that  water   is  exempt   from  Chapter  3,   the   investor   rights  provi-
sions of NAFTA apply regardless.59  Furthermore,  there  is  no  equivalent  
section  pertaining  to  investor  rights  in  the  GATT.  Although  subsequent  
bilateral  trade  agreements  have  adopted  similar  investment  rights  provi-
sions, NAFTA  was  the  first  agreement  to  usher  in  this  new  era  of  corpo-
rate rights.60 Finally, the GATT  conservation  measures  of  Article  XX  do  
not  apply  to  Chapter  11.  In  other  words,  the  investor  rights  provisions  of  
NAFTA  apply  irrespective  of  their  effect  on  environmental  or  conserva-
tion  initiatives.61 
58    Jon  Beauvais,  “Regulatory  Expropriations  under  NAFTA:  Emerging  Principles  
and  Lingering  Doubts”  (2002)  10  N.Y.U.  Envtl.  L.  J.  245  at  262  [Beauvais].  
59    Hinkle, supra  note  38  at  321.
60   Ann  Capling  and  Kim  Richard  Nossal,  “The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Chapter  11:  Investor  
State  Dispute  Mechanisms  in  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  and  the  
Australia  –  United  States  Free  Trade  Agreement”  (Paper  presented  to  the  Oceanic  
Conference  on  International  Studies,  July  2004)[unpublished].
61  WCEL, supra  note  35.
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ii.  Article  1102:  National  Treatment
The  national  treatment  provision  in  Chapter  11  states  that  a  Party  “shall  
accord  to  investors  of  another  Party  treatment  no  less  favourable  than  
it accords, in like circumstances,  to  its  own  investors.”62 The reach of 
Article 1102 hinges on the interpretation of the term “in like circum-
stances.”  
A straightforward reading of Article 1102 mandates that a blanket 
prohibition  on  water  export  must  equally  apply  to  both  Canadian  and  
American   investors.   On   this   interpretation,   a   hypothetical   Canadian  
measure   equally   denying   export   licences   to   domestic   and   foreign   in-
vestors  would  not   likely  engage  Article  1102.  However,   a  potentially  
more  contentious  issue  arises  where  the  phrase  “in  like  circumstances”  
is   interpreted   to  equate  a  Canadian   investor   seeking   to  provide  water  
services  to  municipalities  in  British  Columbia  with  an  American  inves-
tor  seeking  to  provide  Canadian  water  to  a  city  in  California.63 The po-
tential  consequences  of  such  an  expansive  interpretation  of  the  phrase  
“in  like  circumstances”  are  alarming.  This  interpretation  would  essen-
tially  give  American  investors  uninhibited  access  to  Canada’s  vast  water  
resources. Although a paucity of tribunal jurisprudence on the matter 
renders  a  definitive  interpretation  of  this  provision  impossible,  it  would  
be imprudent for Canada to allow the fate of its water to hinge on a 
panel interpretation.64
iii. Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation
Article  1110  mandates  that  no  government  shall  engage  in  actions  in-
volving  expropriation,  or  measures  tantamount  to  expropriation:
No  Party  may   directly   or   indirectly   nationalize   or   expropriate   an  
investment  of  an  investor  of  another  Party  in  its  territory  or  take  a  
measure  tantamount  to  nationalization  or  expropriation  of  such  an  
investment  (“expropriation”).65
62  NAFTA, supra  note  1  [emphasis  added].  
63  Little, supra  note  17  at  150.
64    WCEL, supra  note  35.
65    NAFTA, supra note 1.
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Under  Article  1110,  a  corporation  whose  business  interests  have  been  
adversely  affected  is  entitled,  as  of  right,  to  bring  a  claim  against  gov-
ernment. An international tribunal may award damages directly to a 
corporation  if  governmental  action  amounts  to  measures  tantamount  to  
expropriation.  
Although  “expropriation”  is  not  defined  under  NAFTA, judicial treat-
ment of Article 1110 has enunciated a broad scope of what constitutes 
expropriation.66  The  government  of  Canada  contends  that  a  regulatory  
measure  designed  to  conserve  water  resources  will  not  constitute  expro-
priation.67 However,  at  least  one  NAFTA panel decision challenges this 
view.  In  the  case  of  Pope  and  Talbot,  a  panel  found  that  even  non-­dis-
criminatory  regulations  may  amount  to  “measures  tantamount  to  expro-
priation.”68 This  view  coincides  with  Mr.  Justice  Tysoe’s  interpretation  
of Article 1110 in the case of Mexico  v.  Metaclad  Corp.69 Commenting 
on  the  expansive  scope  of  NAFTA’s  expropriation  provisions,  Tysoe,  J.  
stated  that  government  action  as  innocuous  as  municipal  rezoning  may  
offend  Article  1110.  Article  1110  has  proven   a  valuable  weapon   in   a  
corporation’s legal arsenal as witnessed by the fact that the majority of 
Chapter  11  claims  have  been  brought  under  this  provision.  The  expro-
priation  provisions  are  particularly  troubling  in  the  context  of  existing  
water  use  and  export  licences.  
iv.  The  Sun  Belt  Case  
On October 12, 1999 pursuant to Article 1116 of NAFTA, Sun Belt Water, 
Inc.  of  California  filed  a  Notice  of  Claim  and  Demand  for  Arbitration.70 
Sun  Belt   alleged   that   the  Canadian   federal   government   and   the  Brit-
ish  Columbia   provincial   government   breached  NAFTA Articles 1102, 
1105  and  1110.  The  dispute  arose  out  of  a  1986  contract  between  Sun  
Belt and a British Columbia company to jointly engage in bulk water 
66  Little, supra  note  17  at  147.
67  Johansen, supra note 32.
68     Karen  Campbell  and  Yasmin  Nizami,  “Security  or  Scarcity?  NAFTA,  GATT  
and  Canada’s  Freshwater”  (2001)  West  Coast  Environmental  Law  Publication  1at  6  
[Campbell  &  Nizami].
69  [2001]  B.C.J.  No.  950.  
70   12  October  1999,  (Sun  Belt  Water,  Inc.  v.  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  in  the  Right  
Canada),  John  F.  Carten,  Canadian  filing  agent  for  Sun  Belt  Water,  Inc.  [Arbitration].  
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exports. The  proposal  involved  extracting  water  from  the  internal  waters  
of  British  Columbia  and  transporting  it  via  tanker  to  the  California  city  
of Goleta. The contract was terminated shortly after the agreement was 
reached  when  the  provincial  government,  in  response  to  public  outcry  
and national media attention, placed a moratorium on bulk water re-
movals.71  Sun  Belt  is  seeking  damages  in  excess  of  $10  billion,  claiming  
the  B.C.  government  expropriated  future  profits.72
Although the Sun Belt claim has not yet proceeded to arbitration, 
the  case  serves  as  a  poignant  reminder  of  how  present  government  ac-
tion  may  preclude  future  conservation  pathways.  The  extent  of  current  
water  use  and  riparian  right  permits  in  the  hands  of  foreign  investors  is  
unknown.  However,  as  demonstrated  by   the  Sun  Belt  case,  given   the  
potentially   lucrative   rewards  of   litigation,   foreign   investors  could  file  
claims   asserting   that   a   governmental   denial   of   the   ability   to   exercise  
riparian rights and water use licences for commercial permits amounts 
to  expropriation.73
III. CANADA’S PRESENT WATER POLICY
1. Introduction
On  February  10,  1999,  Hon.  Lloyd  Axworthy,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  
Affairs,  and  Hon.  Christie  Stewart,  then  Minister  of  the  Environment,  
announced a three-part strategy to safeguard Canada’s water supply.74 
The plan came in the wake of political fallout after an Ontario Company 
announced  it  was  going  to  begin  exporting  bulk  water.  The  federal  gov-
ernment’s strategy includes three key elements:
1. Amending the International  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  Act 
[IBWTA];;75
2.   A  Canada  wide  accord  prohibiting  bulk  water  transfers;;  and
71  Anderson, supra note 11 at 221.
72  Arbitration, supra note 70.
73  WCEL, supra  note  35.
74    Johansen, supra note 32.
75     R.S.C.  1985,  c.  I-­17  as  amended.
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3. A joint reference to the International Joint Commission (IJC) 
regarding water related issues, including trade, in the Great 
Lakes region.76
In  addition  to  the  water  protection  strategy,  the  government  also  reaf-
firmed  its  long-­standing  policy  that  “water  is  not  covered  by  the  NAFTA 
or  any  other  trade  agreement.”77 
i.  Amending  the  International  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  Act  (IBWTA)
The  first  part  of  the  government’s  three-­pronged  water  strategy  involved  
amending the IBWTA   to  prohibit  bulk  water   removals  from  the  Great  
Lakes basin. The  government  chose   to   legislate  a  bulk  water  removal 
ban, as opposed to a bulk water export ban, because a prohibition on 
water   removal   “is   more   comprehensive,   environmentally   sound   […]  
and  is  more  consistent  with  Canada’s  international  trade  obligations.”78 
During  the  second  reading  of  the  amending  Legislation,  MP  Bill  Blaikie  
questioned  the  logic  of  a  ban  on  bulk  water  removal:  
The   very   language   of   removal   tells   the   story.   The   [government]  
refuse[s]  to  use  the  word  export  because  if  they  talked  about  water  
exports   […]   they  would  have   a   test   case  with   respect   to  NAFTA  
because  NAFTA  deals  with  exports.79
Critics  of  the  government’s  decision  to  alter  the  IBWTA denounce the 
limited  geographic  scope  of  the  amendments  as  inadequate  to  protect  all  
of Canada’s water, indicating that the amendments only apply to a lim-
ited  number  of  watersheds.  Areas  covered  under  the  prohibition  include  
the  Great  Lakes,  part  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  the  St.  Croix  and  Upper  
St.  John  Rivers,  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  Although  the  federal  gov-
ernment’s  exclusive  constitutional  jurisdiction  over  international  treaties  
and  boundary  waters  account  for  the  relative  ease  in  which  the  prohibi-
tion was enacted, the same constitutional jurisdiction also accounts for 
the  limited  application  of  the  prohibitions.  Given  provincial  jurisdiction  
76  Johansen, supra note 32.
77  Ibid.
78    Ibid.
79  Ibid. 
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over  most  natural  resources  under  s.  92(13)  and  s.  92A  of  the  Constitu-
tion Act, 1867,  it  is  beyond  the  federal  government’s  constitutional  com-
petency  to  legislate  similar  prohibitions  on  lakes,  rivers  and  watersheds  
that  are  solely  within  the  geographic  confines  of  a  province.80 
ii. Canada Wide Accord on Bulk Water
The  purpose  of  the  Canada-­wide  Accord  was  to  ensure  that  all  provinces  
adopted  measures  to  prohibit  bulk  water  removal  over  waters   in  their  
constitutional jurisdiction. The merits of the proposed Accord were de-
bated  by  the  Canadian  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Environment.  The  Ac-
cord  never  materialized,  however,  as  Quebec  and  the  three  prairie  prov-
inces  failed  to  endorse  its  mandate.  Nonetheless,  all  provinces  presently  
have  in  place  some  form  of  bulk  water  prohibition.  Provincial  measures  
range  from  legislative  prohibitions,  such  as  British  Columbia’s  Water 
Protection  Act,  to  softer  prohibitions  in  the  form  of  official  policy  and  
regulations.81 Although  provincial  measures  adhere  to  the  overarching  
philosophy  of  water  protection,  the  level  of  protection  afforded,  and  the  
means  chosen  to  achieve  the  desired  goals,  vary  greatly.82
During  Parliamentary  debates  on  the  water  accord,  MP  Charles  Cac-
cia,  an  outspoken  critic  of  the  government’s  water  policies,  stated  “the  
proposed  accord  will  lead  to  a  patchwork  of  provincial  initiatives,  thus  
making  Canada  vulnerable  to  trade  challenges.”83 This  critique  is  as  rel-
evant  today  as  it  was  when  the  comments  were  made.  At  present,  Cana-
da  lacks  a  comprehensive,  clear  and  uniform  policy  on  water  exports.  
iii. Reference to the International Joint Commission
The third element of Canada’s strategy to safeguard its water resourc-
es was a joint Canadian-American reference to the International Joint 
Commission   (IJC).   The   IJC   is   an   independent   bi-­national   organiza-
tion created under the Boundary  Waters  Treaty.84 Its stated purpose is 
80     R.S.C.  1985,  App.  II,  No.  5.
81     RSBC  1996,  Chapter  484.
82    Anderson, supra  note  11  at  234.
83    Johansen, supra note 32.
84    Treaty  relating  to  Boundary  Waters  and  Questions  arising  with  Canada, 11 
January 1909, U.K.T.S. 1910 No. 23. 
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to  “help  prevent  and  resolve  disputes  relating  to  the  use  and  quality  of  
boundary  waters  and  to  advise  Canada  and  the  United  States  on  related  
questions.”85 The IJC was charged with studying the potential effects of 
bulk  water  removals  or  exports  from  the  Great  Lakes  region.86 On Feb-
ruary  22,  2000,  the  IJC  released  its  final  report,  entitled  Protection  of  the  
Waters of the Great Lakes.87 The recommendations of the IJC included:
• Signatories  “should  not  permit  any  new  proposal  for  the  removal  
of water from the Great Lakes Basin to proceed unless the 
proponent  can  demonstrate  that  the  removal  would  not  endanger  
the  integrity  of  the  ecosystem  of  the  Great  Lakes  Basin.”
• In  assessing  a  proposal,  signatories  should  give  “full  
consideration”  to  “potential  cumulative  impacts  of  the  proposed  
removal.”
• A  proposal  must  ensure  “no  net  loss”  to  the  watershed  from  which  
the water was taken.
• A proposal must guarantee the water “be returned in a condition 
that  protects  the  quality  of  and  prevents  the  introduction  of  alien  
invasive  species  into  the  waters  of  the  Great  Lakes.” 88 
Environment  Canada  argues  that,  given  the  adverse  environmental  ef-
fects  created  by  bulk  water  removals,  application  of  the  IJC  recommen-
dations  effectively  precludes  bulk  water  transfer.89
85     International  Joint  Commission  website,  online:  <http://www.ijc.org/en/
background/biogr_commiss.htm>.
86     Tara  Boldt  -­Van  Rooy,  “Bottling  Up  Your  Natural  Resources:  The  Fight  Over  
Bottled  Water  Extraction  In  The  United  States”  (2003)  18  J.  Land  Use  &  Envtl.  L.  
267 at 290.
87     International  Joint  Commission,  Protection  of  the  Waters  of  the  Great  Lakes:  
Final  Report  to  the  Governments  of  Canada  and  the  United  States,  March  2000.  
International  Joint  Commission,  online:  <http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/
finalreport.html>  [IJC  Report].
88    Ibid.
89    FAQ, supra note 30 at Question #3.
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Regarding Canada’s NAFTA obligations, the IJC’s conclusions were 
largely  supportive  of  the  measures  and  policies  adopted  by  the  Canadian  
government.90 The IJC stated that “the NAFTA and the GATT agree-
ments  do  not  constrain  or  affect  the  sovereign  right  of  a  government  to  
decide whether or not it will allow natural resources within its jurisdic-
tion  to  be  exploited  and,  if  a  natural  resource  is  allowed  to  be  exploited,  
the  pace  and  manner  of  such  exploitation.”91 In reaching its conclusions, 
the Committee appeared to rely on a December 1993 Joint Statement 
(discussed  above)  and  a  November  24,  1999  letter  from  the  U.S.  Deputy  
Trade  Representative  to  the  IJC  stating:  “[i]n  our  view,  the  implementa-
tion  [of  recommendations  not  to  authorize  or  permit  bulk  water  trans-
fers] would not run afoul of the obligations imposed by international 
trade  agreements.”92 
The   findings   of   the   IJC   have   not   been   universally   accepted.  The  
same day the IJC released its report Jamie Dunn, water campaigner for 
the  Council  of  Canadians,  expressed  his  “deep  disappointment  that  in  
its  final  report  […]  the  International  Joint  Commission  squandered  an  
historic  opportunity  to  speak  for  the  Canada  and  the  United  States.”93
Two  aspects  of  the  IJC  report  require  comment.  First,  the  IJC  is  an  
advisory  body  established  to  inform  the  American  and  Canadian  govern-
ments on Great Lakes issues. The report is simply one agency’s opinion. 
Although  its  opinion  may  be  utilized  as  a  source  of  treaty  interpretation,  
it is not legally binding. Second, the IJC states that Canada’s interna-
tional  obligations  do  not  prevent  it  from  taking  measures  to  safeguard  
water resources as long as there is no discrimination against foreign 
investors.  This   leads   to   the   conclusion   that   once   bulk  water   removal  
–  or  activity  analogous  to  bulk  water  removal  –  is  permitted,  NAFTA’s 
substantive  obligations  apply.  
iv. Summary of the Government Response
Perhaps  the  most  prescient  statement  in  the  IJC’s  final  report  was  the  
recommendation that Canada and the United States should limit liability 
under the NAFTA by “clearly articulating their water-management poli-
90  Johansen, supra note 33.
91  IJC Report, supra  note  87.
92  Johansen, supra note 33.
93  Johansen, supra note 33.
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cies in a fully transparent manner, by acting in a manner that is entirely 
consistent with their stated policy, and by limiting the time for which 
authorizations  are  valid.”94  Canada  has  failed  to  heed  this  advice.  
Although the amendments to the IBWTA  are  an   improvement,   the  
limited geographic application of the Act is problematic. Accepting that 
constitutional  sensitivities  preclude  unilateral  federal  action  on  internal  
waters,  nonetheless,   the   federal  government’s   failed  Canada-­wide  ac-
cord   and   the   existing   provincial   patchwork   of   policy   are   insufficient  
to  guard  against  exposure  to  NAFTA   liability.  The  government  cannot  
delegate  to  the  provinces  the  paramount  responsibility  of  protecting  do-
mestic water resources. Similarly, although the IJC report offers Canada 
positive  reinforcement,  the  government  cannot  rely  on  the  report  as  gos-
pel.  The  methodology  of  the  report  is  flawed  in  that  it  relies  on  a  number  
of  soft  sources  that  are  not  legally  binding.  Although  the  Canadian  gov-
ernment’s  three-­pronged  plan  has  accomplished  some  positive  change,  
more work needs to be done to safeguard Canada’s water resources.  A 
comprehensive  and  clearly  articulated  strategy  should  be  implemented.  
IV. PROPOSED POLICY ALTERNATIVES
1. The Need for Action
Beginning with the Canada-­United  States  Free  Trade  Agreement, North 
America  has  aggressively  pursued  an  agenda  of  economic  integration.95 
Recent  events  indicate  that  Canada,  the  United  States  and  Mexico  are  
preparing  to  enter  a  more  interdependent  relationship.  In  a  March  23,  
2005  joint  statement,  all  three  NAFTA signatories announced the forma-
tion  of  a  new  “Security  and  Prosperity  Partnership  of  North  America.”96 
The  object  of  this  partnership  is  to  achieve  the  “mutually  dependent  and  
complementary”  goals  of  economic  growth  and  enhanced  security.  Two  
of the chief policy aims of the partnership are to “promote sectoral col-
94    IJC Report, supra  note  87.
95     2  January  1988,  C.T.S.  1989/3  (entry  into  force  1  January  1989).
96   Governments  of  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  Joint  Statement  (23  
March  2005),  online:  <http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Mar/23-­215428.
html>.
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laboration  in  energy,  transportation,  financial  services,  technology”  and  
to  “reduce  the  costs  of  trade  through  the  efficient  movement  of  goods  
and  people.”97
With this renewed commitment to increased regional reliance, Can-
ada’s water resources will certainly become more of an issue. This re-
alization  has  already  begun  to  take  hold  in  Canadian  political  circles.  At  
the  2005  Liberal  Biennial  Policy  Convention,  the  Ontario  contingent  put  
forth  a  motion  stating  that,  “whereas  legal  experts  have  indicated  that  
water is considered a tradable good under NAFTA  […]  the  Party  should  
encourage  the  Government  to  do  anything  in  its  constitutional  jurisdic-
tion  to  prevent  all  forms  of  water  export.”98 Although the motion was 
not  incorporated  into  official  Liberal  Party  policy,  it  demonstrates  that  
internal political opposition to Canada’s longstanding policy of denying 
water is a NAFTA  “good”  has  arrived  on  the  national  political  agenda.  
Given  growing  domestic  political  pressure  and  increased  international  
economic integration, it is essential that Canada adopt a clear national 
water strategy.
2. Legislation
The  most  obvious  means  to  ensure  absolute  sovereignty  over  Canada’s  
water   resources   is   to   legislate  a  prohibition  on  water  exports.  Such  a  
prohibition  would  not  infringe  provincial  jurisdictional  or  constitutional  
sensitivities,  given  the  federal  government’s  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  
international trade. Furthermore, federal legislation would combat the 
problematic patchwork of policy and the sliding scale of water protec-
tion  that  presently  exists  across  the  country.  Definitive  federal  legisla-
tion would also adhere to the IJC recommendation of clearly articulat-
ing an unambiguous national standard.
Some   key   players   in   the  water   debate   support   the   legislative   ap-
proach. The Council of Canadians has continually called on the fed-
eral  government  to  implement  a  national  water  act  that  “outline[s]  the  
protections  needed  environmentally  [and]  really  puts  limits  on  the  use  
97  Ibid.
98    “Policy  Proposal”  (Ontario,  Liberal  Party  Biennial  Policy  Conference  Handbook,  
3  March  2005).
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and  abuse  of  our  water  from  industry.”99 The  West  Coast  Environmen-
tal Law Association (WCEL) similarly concludes, “the best federal 
approach   for  preventing  bulk  water   removals   from  Canada   is   the  en-
actment  of  federal  legislation  designed  specifically  for  the  purpose  [of  
preventing  exports].”100 
Although  the  ease  with  which  the  federal  government  could  imple-
ment  a  prohibition  on  water  exports  is  attractive,  there  are  a  number  of  
problems associated with this approach. First, as stated in a legal opin-
ion drafted by the WCEL, “no matter how carefully designed, Canadian 
measures  to  prevent  bulk  water  exports  or  diversion  projects  would  still  
be  vulnerable  to  trade  challenges  and/or  investor-­state  claims.”101 The 
national  treatment  provisions  of  Article  301  and  1102  negate  the  pos-
sibility  of  prohibiting  exports  without   implementing  similar  domestic  
measures.     As   the  above  discussion  on  Article  1102  notes,   the  phrase  
“in  like  circumstances”  may  require  extending  any  prohibition  on  water  
exports  to  include  transfers  between  provinces  or  even  regions  within  
a  province.  The  political  and  economic  feasibility  of  such  a  domestic  
constraint  is  highly  questionable.  
Proposals  to  circumvent  NAFTA  liability  almost  universally  suggest  
crafting  legislation  with  an  environmental  objective,  aimed  not  at  trade  
but rather couched in terms of regulating the general use and conser-
vation   of  water.  This  was   the   approach   taken   by   the   federal   govern-
ment in amending the IBWTA.  When  extended  to  provincial  Canadian  
watercourses,  however,  this  suggestion  is  inherently  self-­defeating.  The  
federal  government  must  ground  any  water  prohibition  in  its  exclusive  
constitutional  jurisdiction  over  international  trade.  The  irony  is  that  by  
crafting  legislation  prohibiting  exports  under  the  federal  government’s  s.  
91  international  trade  powers,  it  contravenes  NAFTA Article 309 (import 
and  export  restrictions)  and  potentially  the  national  treatment  provisions  
of  Article  302  and  1102.  By  crafting  environmentally  based  legislation  
prohibiting  bulk  water  a  removal,  however,  the  federal  government  en-
croaches  on  provincial  authority  over  natural  resources.  The  proposed  
Canada  wide  accord  was  the  federal  government’s  solution  to  this  quan-
dary.    The  obvious  shortfall  of  any  proposal  similar  to  the  Canada  wide  
99  Interview  with  Maude  Barlow  (January  25,  2005),  online:  Mother  Jones  website  
<http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/2005/01/maude_barlow.html  >.
100  WCEL, supra  note  35.
101  Ibid.
96 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
accord  is  its  voluntary  nature  and  the  wide  latitude  the  provinces  will  
almost certainly demand in crafting and implementing the policy.
Second,  any  suggestion  of  water  export  legislation  is  contradictory  
to  the  long-­standing  government  position  that  water  does  not  qualify  as  
a NAFTA  “good.”    At  a  February  1999  press  conference  following  the  
announcement  of  the  government’s  water  policy,  Hon.  Lloyd  Axworthy  
was  asked  why  the  government  did  not  simply   legislate  a  ban  on  ex-
ports.    He  replied,  “[O]nce  you  start  doing  that  then  you  make  water  into  
a tradable commodity and it gets subject to all the trade rules going back 
to GATT  of  1947 […]  We’re  saying  there’s  a  much  more  effective  way  
of  doing  it  and  that  is  to  treat  it  in  its  natural  state.”102 The  government’s  
blanket   refusal   to   consider  water   as   a   “good”   essentially   precludes   a  
host  of  policy  alternatives.  This  threshold  denial  of  NAFTA’s applica-
tion  to  water  forecloses  the  possibility  of  export  legislation.
Third,  some  critics  suggest  that,  even  if  non-­discriminatory  legisla-
tion   could   be   crafted,   it  would  be   nonsensical   for   the   government   to  
place  an  outright  ban  on  such  a  potentially   lucrative   investment.  The  
sentiment that Canada is failing to harness the economic power of its 
water   resources   is   captured  by  Former  Newfoundland  Premier  Roger  
Grimes  who   felt   that   by  banning  water   exports   from  Gisborne  Lake,  
“we’re   just   letting   it   spill   into   the   ocean.”103 A legislated prohibition 
on  water  export  would  thwart  provincial  aspirations  to  utilize  water  re-
sources  as  a  revenue  stream.
Even  though  federal  legislation  prohibiting  water  exports  will  most  
likely infringe NAFTA  Articles  309  (export  restrictions),  315  (propor-
tionality)   and   potentially   the   national   treatment   provisions   301   and  
1102,  many  environmental  organizations  advocate  immediate  action.104 
The  question  of  when  (or  if)  to  legislate  is  essentially  a  policy  decision  
that  the  federal  government  will  have  to  make  after  analyzing  the  costs  
associated  with  pre-­emptive  unilateral  action.  Irrespective  of  when  leg-
islation  is  contemplated,  one  thing  is  clear:  sooner  or  later  the  govern-
ment must negotiate with its NAFTA partners.
102  Johansen, supra note 32.
103  Campbell  &  Nizami,  supra note  68  at  12.
104    WCEL, supra  note  35.
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3. International Avenues
The  most  effective  means  to  secure  control  of  Canada’s  water  resources  
is  to  create  sufficient  space  for  policy  options  within  the  NAFTA frame-
work. NAFTA  contains  a  number  of  mechanisms  for  amendments,  ex-
clusions and adoptions. Reliance on these measures is the most appro-
priate  way  to  ensure  sovereign  dominion  over  Canada’s  water.
The  most  obvious  way  to  avoid  NAFTA  liability  is  to  avoid  NAFTA. 
Under  Article  2205,  Canada  is  permitted  to  withdraw  from  NAFTA with 
six  months  notice.  Although  withdrawal  is  perhaps  an  economically  un-
feasible  solution  (87%  of  Canada’s  trade,  and  62%  of  Canada’s  wealth  
is  dependent  of  the  U.S.),  it  does  illustrate  a  fine  point:  Canada’s  water  
resources are ultimately within its control.105     The  real  question  is  the  
amount  of  political  capital  Canada  is  prepared  to  expend  in  reasserting  
that control.
A less drastic option is to negotiate a broad NAFTA-­wide  exemption  
for  water   export   controls.  Article   2102   provides   an   almost   unlimited  
scope to amend NAFTA.  Under  Article  2102,   a  Party  may  effect   any  
“modification   or   addition”   given   such  measures   are   agreed  on   by   all  
the  parties.  Governments  have  used  this  provision  to  insulate  national  
security   from   trade   obligations.  The   advantage   of  Article   2102   is   its  
reach. All other NAFTA-­amending  mechanisms  lack  the  wholesale  cov-
erage that Article 2102 engages. The omnibus nature of Article 2102, 
however,  is  a  double-­edged  sword.  Given  the  breadth  and  scope  of  such  
a  powerful  exclusionary  provision,  the  Article  is  reserved  for  only  the  
most  essential  economic  spheres;;  trade  in  water  may  not  qualify.  Simi-
larly,  the  inherent  contradiction  of  excluding  goods  from  a  liberal  trade  
agreement  –  particularly  a  good  that  was  not  excluded  upon  the  nego-
tiation of NAFTA – runs contrary to the spirit of NAFTA. Negotiating a 
general  exception  may  prove  an  insurmountable  barrier  given  Canada’s  
political and economic clout.
A  less  invasive  means  of  shielding  water  from  NAFTA liability is to 
negotiate  water  conservation  agreements  with  the  other  NAFTA signa-
tories  and  have   them  added  as  attachments.  Article  104.2  specifically  
envisions  such  action  by  allowing  parties  to  attach  bilateral  or  trilateral  
environmental  agreements  to  Annex  104.  Presently  Annex  104  includes  
105    Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Statistics 
(3  March  2005)  DFAIT,  online:  <http://www.dfait-­maeci.gc.ca/eet/menu-­en.asp  >.
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two bilateral agreements: A Canada-U.S. Agreement on Transboundary 
Movement  of  Hazardous  Waste  and  a  Mexico-­U.S.  Agreement  on  Pro-
tection  and   Improvement  of   the  Environment   in   the  Border  Area.  An  
Annex   104   conservation   or   environmental   agreement   prohibiting   the  
removal  and  export  of  water  would  take  precedence  over  countervailing  
NAFTA  provisions.
Another  alternative  is  to  petition  the  NAFTA Commission to issue 
an  interpretive  statement  under  Article  1131.2.  Such  a  statement  could  
stipulate  that  the  definition  of  “investment”,  presently  outlined  in  Arti-
cle  1139,  does  not  include  water  permits,  licences  or  other  related  activi-
ties.106 This statement may take a similar form as the December 1993 
Joint  Statement.  Such  an  interpretive  statement,  however,  would  only  
extend  to  Chapter  11,  thus  leaving  open  Chapter  3  liability.
The  Canadian  government  could  also  circumvent  the  investor  pro-
visions  of  NAFTA  by   jointly  amending  Annex  1138.2.  This  provision  
allows  for  Parties,  on  mutual  agreement,  to  prevent  a  corporation  from  
seeking  a  remedy  for  a  particular  activity.  This  measure  essentially  es-
toppes corporations from bringing a Chapter 11 claim. Canada could 
lobby the other NAFTA  signatories  to  include  an  explicit  exclusion  for  
legislation  prohibiting  bulk  water  removals  or  exports.107
The   above   recommendations   would   be   of   varying   effectiveness.  
Amending  Article  2201  or  adding  a  conservation  treaty  to  Annex  104  
are   likely   the  most  effective  measures   for  Canada   to  pursue.  Amend-
ments  to  Articles  1131.2  or  1138.2  do  not  enjoy  the  scope  of  the  above  
measures,  however  they  do  grant  immunity  against  Chapter  11  claims.  
All  proposed  amendments,  however,  share  one  essential  trait:  they  are  
premised on an assumption that Canada is willing, or able, to engage 
in  the  necessary  negotiation  and  compromise  involved  in  amending  an  
international agreement.   
CONCLUSION
The  likelihood  of  a  global  water  shortage  is  quickly  becoming  a  reality.  
As this most precious of resources dwindles, water will become a chief 
consideration in national security and economic policy. Canada is in the 
106  WCEL, supra  note  35.
107 WCEL, supra  note  35.
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enviable  position  of  holding  one  fifth  of  the  world  fresh  water  supplies.  
Although  Canada’s  ownership  of  its  vast  freshwater  resources  is  certain,  
its  ability  to  manage  and  control  its  water  resources  is  not  as  definite.  
A host of NAFTA  provisions   threaten   to   impeach  Canada’s  sover-
eignty  over  its  water  resources.  Chapter  3’s  national  treatment  provision  
(Article  301),  prohibition  on  export  controls  (Article  309)  and  propor-
tionality  requirement  (Article  315)  collectively  restrict  government  ac-
tion.  The   investor   rights   provisions   of  Chapter   11   allow   for   corpora-
tions  to  bring  claims  for  breach  of  national  treatment  provisions  (Article  
1102)  and,  perhaps  more  invasively,  claim  that  a  government  action  is  
“tantamount  to  expropriation”  (Article  1110).
The  Canadian  government’s  response  to  trade  concerns  has  been  in-
sufficient  to  adequately  safeguard  its  water  resources.  Trapped  between  
Constitutional constraints and international trade obligations, the feder-
al  government  has  failed  to  establish  a  clear  and  comprehensive  national  
water  policy.  The  government’s  three-­pronged  strategy,  although  effec-
tive  in  safeguarding  boundary  waters,  is  limited  in  scope.  By  allowing  
the  provinces  to  determine  water  protection  priority  and  measures,  the  
government  has  allowed  for  the  development  of  a  patchwork  of  provin-
cial  policies  of  varying  effectiveness.
As North American integration proceeds at a remarkable pace, it is 
paramount that Canada “clearly articulate a water management policy in 
a  fully  transparent  manner.”108  Given  that  federal  legislation  will  almost  
certainly  violate  Canada’s  international  obligations,  the  most  desirable  
route is through political negotiation and compromise. Only through 
amendments to NAFTA can Canada once again become author of its 
own future. 
108    IJC Report, supra  note  87.
